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ENDING SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
INSURANCE: THE NONDISCRIMINATION
IN INSURANCE ACT
INTRODUCTION

Sex discrimination has existed since the time men and women first
realized that there were differences between them. Numerous federal
acts have addressed this issue,' yet in the absence of an Equal Rights
Amendment2 sex discrimination is still prevalent in our society. This
discrimination is blatant in the insurance industry. Women, as a
group, live longer than men.3 Men, as a group, have more automobile
accidents than women.4 Being female, however, does not guarantee
longevity anymore than being male causes collisions. Factors more accurate and reliable than sex are available for determining insurance
premiums. Yet based upon these statistical generalizations, insurance
companies have long pursued a policy of discrimination which would
clearly be illegal if based upon categorizations recognized as discriminatory, such as race or religion.
The Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act (H.R. 100) is designed to
eliminate inequities in insurance. Introduced on January 3, 1983 by
Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.), 5 and currently pending debate
on the House floor, H.R. 100 provides:
It shall be unlawful discriminatory action for any insurer because

of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of any person or any
group of persons ... to treat such applicant or insured differently than
the insurer treats or would treat any other applicant or insured with
respect to the terms, conditions, rates, benefits or requirements of such
insurance contract.

3.

See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)). Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5314, 5315, 5316; 42 U.S.S. §§ 2000e-I to e-6,
2000e-8 to e-9, 2000e-13 to e-17 (1976)).
872 FACTS ON FILE (1983). On November 15, 1983, the House of Representatives narrowly
defeated the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The majority vote
was just six shy of the two-thirds majority needed to send the amendment to the states for
ratification.
In 1979 female life expectancy was 77.6 years compared with 69.9 years for males. U.S.

4.

NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 71 (1982-83) [hereinafter cited as VITAL
STATISTICS]. These conclusions are based on statistical evidence taken from actuarial tables.
See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN., THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO

5.

RISK ON DRIVING RECORD, JUNE 1973 reprinted in Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of
1983. Hearingson H.A 100 Before the Subcomm on Commerce, Transportationand Tourism
ofthe House Comm On Energy andCommerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1001 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
129 CONG. REC. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1983).

1.

2.
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It shall be an unlawful discriminatory action for any insurer to utilize any statistical table (whether of mortality, life expectancy, morbiding, disability, disability termination, or losses) or any other statistical
compilation as a basis for any action which is contrary to this section.6
The effect of this bill is to make the current industry practice of using
sex as a basis for setting insurance premiums illegal. No longer would
insurance companies be able to charge young men higher auto and life
insurance premiums solely because of their sex. The use of sex-based
actuarial tables to determine life insurance premiums and pension plan
benefits would also be prohibited. In essence, similarly situated men
and women would no longer pay dissimilar insurance premiums or receive dissimilar benefits simply because of their sex.
While much debate 7 has centered around the effects of H.R. 100 on
all types of insurance, including health,, disability, life, and auto insurance, and pension plans, the scope of this note is limited to a discussion
of the effect H.R. 100 would have on the structure of pension plans and
auto insurance policies.
PENSION PLANS
Approximately fort -six million people nationwide participate in
460,000 pension plans.Z Participants usually receive their benefits in
one of three forms: the single life annuity, joint and survivor annuity,
or lump sum payments. 9
Under a single life annuity plan, the recipient receives periodic payments for life, normally on a monthly basis.10 Joint and survivor annuities are similar to the single life annuity with an additional provision
that entitles the recipient's designated survivor, usually the spouse, to
receive benefits for life." With lump sum benefit plans, the recipient
receives a single payment comprising the total benefit.' 2
These three basic benefit forms are usually offered under either defined benefit or defined contribution plans.' 3 Twenty-nine percent of
private pension plans are defined benefit plans, whereby an employer
provides employees with a specified level of retirement benefits in a
particular form.' 4 The employer accomplishes this by making "contributions [which] are actuarially determined based on predicted benefits
payable in the future."' 5 The remaining seventy-one percent are de6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a), (b), 129 CONG. REc. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1983).
Hearings, supra note 4, at 669-963.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 60 (statement of Timothy Ryan, Solicitor, Department of Labor).
Ryan, Nondiscrimfinationin Pension Plans, 34 LAB. L. J. 201, 202-03 (1983).
Id at 203.
Id
Id
Id
Id
M. Connerton, Cost Study of the Impact of an Equal Benefits Rule on Pension Benefits, 7
(1983) (unpublished report prepared for the Office of Regulatory Economics, U.S. Dep't of
Labor) (available at offices of Journal of Legislation).
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fined contribution plans. 6 Under these plans, employers make annual
contributions to individual accounts established for each employee.' 7
Neither of these structures is inherently discriminatory.' 8 The
problem arises under defined contribution plans when benefits are converted from their original form to an optional form, usually a life annuity.' 9 The lump sum benefit that the retiree is entitled to is "converted
into a life annuity on the basis of its actuarial value measured by the
life expectancy of the retiree."2 0 Industry custom relies on tables which
include sex as a factor in calculating life expectancy. 2 ' Since women,
as a group, live longer than men,2 2 their benefits are projected to be
spread out over a longer period of time. 23 Therefore, each woman receives lower monthly payments than each man receives. When converted into life annuities, two equal lump sum benefits will result in a
female retiree receiving a lower monthly income than her male coworker will receive.
Defined benefit plans present the mirror image of defined contributions plans. Employees, rather than employers, contribute to the pension fund. Under these direct benefit plans, women must make greater
monthly contributions than men in order to receive equal monthly benefits upon retirement. 24 The result of using sex-based actuarial tables is
that women make greater total contributions than men in order to receive equal monthly benefits, or receive lower monthly benefits for
equal total contributions.
Although the "average woman" outlives the "average man," it is
inherently discriminatory to reduce the pension of a female retiree to a
level below that of a similarly situated male simply because statistics
show that females as a group outlive males. The United States
Supreme Court espoused this position when it struck down state-managed pension plans which discriminated in this manner.25
TRADITIONAL BASES FOR INDUSTRY PRACTICES
The insurance industry determines rates by using actuarial mathematics, which is a combination of probability and statistics. 26 Insurance companies group individuals according to the risk they
represent.27 Risk classification enables insurers to accurately predict
16.

Ryan, supra note 9, at 203.

17.

1d

18. Id
19. Id
20. Id
21. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 93 (1981).
22. VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 3.

Id
City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
Brief for the American Academy of Actuaries, as amicus curiae, at 3, Arizona Governing
Committee v. Norris, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983) [hereinafter cited as American Academy Briefl.
27. Brief for the American Council of Life Insurers, as amicus curiae, at 8, Arizona Governing
23.
24.
25.
26.
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cost and promotes competition by placing policyholders in groups
whose members present similar loss potential.28
Risk classification determines policy rates by which premiums adequate to assure industry solvency are established.2 9 According to the
American, Council of Life Insurance, "[a]ccurate risk classification is
essential for maintaining . . . financial solvency."3
Sex, insurers
maintain, is an accurate and efficient indicator of longevity, 3 which
justifies the use of sex-based actuarial tables.
Women live longer than men, and will therefore receive a greater
number of monthly payments over their lifetimes. Women in the aggregate receive a greater total amount of benefits than men. "If women
are to receive equal value for contributions paid in, then women must
receive smallerperiodic payments."3 2 The insurance industry contends
that this practice is fair. "To provide equal periodic payments to women over their full lifetime would require a gift-not a return on accumulations they earn, but a gift."' 33 Female retirees who must meet the
same monthly expenses as males on a reduced income insist that this
practice is inherently discriminatory. Women argue that they are not
seeking "gifts" but simply equal treatment.
"Everything else being equal," women have a greater life expectancy than men, and are considered better economic risks. 34 Yet everything else is not equal. The difference in life expectancy between men
and women can be attributed to factors relating more to overall lifestyle than to sex. 35 Actuarial tables indicate sex is an efficient and accurate indicator of life expectancy, 36 but it is only one factor, and one
which civil rights policy mandates
not be used to distinguish between
'37
persons "otherwise equal.
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE IN INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION

Classifying people by sex for the purpose of establishing insurance
38
premiums violates the basic principles of national civil rights policy

35.

Committee v. Norris, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983) [hereinafter cited as American Council Briefl.
Hatch, Should Insurance be Blind to Sex
12 BRIEF 10, 13 (Aug. 1983).
Id
American Council Brief, supra note 27, at 9.
Id The Council cites age and sex as the "two most significantly reliable factors statistically
shown to quantify the risk of longevity."
Id at 10 (emphasis in original).
Hearings, supra note 4, at 412 (statement of George K. Bernstein testifying on behalf of U.S.
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., Firemen's Fund Insurance Co., Republic Insurance Co., and the
New York State Teachers' Retirement System, in opposition to H.R. 100).
Hearings, supra note 4, at 296 (statement of the Alliance of American Insurers in opposition
to H.R. 100).
See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.

36.

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, supra note 21.

37.

Hearings, supra note 4, at 53. (Letter from Representative John Dingell, D-Mich., to Meg
Greenfield, Editorial Page Editor, The Washington Post).
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. (1976)).

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

38.
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by attributing characteristics of the group to the individual. Two recent
Supreme Court cases specifically addressed this issue as it applied to

public employers' pension plans.
The 1978 case of City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and
Power v. Manhart3 9 involved a claim by female employees that the
city's pension plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40
The Court invalidated the plan which required females to make larger
contributions to the pension fund than males in order to receive equal
monthly benefits upon retirement. 4' Holding that the differential violated both the language and policy of Title VII which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex, the Court found
the practice discriminatory in its "treatment of a person
in a manner
42
which but for that person's sex would be different.
In Manhart, the Court recognized that the Civil Rights Act focuses
on fairness to the individual and precludes treating individuals merely
as components of a group.4 3 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority
states that "even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient
reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does
not apply." 44 Thus, that women as a group outlive men cannot support
using sex as the sole factor in a life expectancy determination. Instead,
this determination should be based on individual factors.
In the 1983 case Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris,45 the Court
reaffirmed the Manhart decision when it struck down Arizona's voluntary pension plan. The plan offered state employees the option of receiving retirement benefits from one of several state-selected insurance
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

435 U.S. at 702.
The specific complaint in Manhart alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) which
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
(emphasis added).
The 1972 amendments and extended Title VII coverage to most federal, state, and local
government employees. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000(e)-2 to (e)-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
Manhart, 435 U.S. 717.
Id at 711. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (defining "employer" and
"employee"); id. § 2000e-2 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (making certain employment practices
unlawful).
435 U.S. at 708.
Id (emphasis added).
- U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983). Justice Marshall wrote the 5-4 majority opinion. The
Court refused to make this holding retroactive because the costs of compliance would have
disrupted the plan and harmed the employees. It therefore made the ruling effective as of
August. In a per curiam opinion the Court held that the Arizona plan constituted sex-based
discrimination in violation of title VII. It ordered that "all retirement benefits derived from
contributions made after the decision today [judgment was issued Aug. 1, 19831 must be
calculated without regard to the sex of the beneficiary." Id at 3493. A separate opinion of a
majority of the Court, written by Justice Marshall, concurred in these decisions. A third
opinion was written by Justice Powell. This opinion, expressing a unanimous position on the
issue, emphasized that there was "no justification for [the] Court ... to impose this magnitude of burden retroactively on the public." Id at 3510.
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companies, all of which paid women lower monthly pension benefits
than men because of sex-based actuarial tables.46 Again the Court held
that the use of sex-based mortality tables violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.47 The Court followed the reasoning of Manhart,
stating "Congress has decided that classifications based on sex, like
those based on national origin or race, are unlawful. ' 48 Both cases alleviated the use of sex-based actuarial tables in state run pension plans.
Manhart involved a defined benefit plan and specifically addressed the
issue of unequal contributions, 49 while Norris involved a defined contribution plan and addressed the issue of unequal benefits. 50 Yet, despite these two decisions invalidating insurance discrimination in the
public sector, it remains prevalent in the private sector. 5 '
THE NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
House bill 100 effectively deals with this problem by making it unlawful and discriminatory to distinguish on the basis of sex "with respect to the terms, conditions, rates, benefits or requirements" of the
insurance contract. 2
The insurance industry contends that under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 53 the regulation of insurance should be left to the states and
that H.R. 100 impinges upon this right.5 4 The McCarran-Ferguson
Act, passed in 1948, makes insurance regulation a state responsibility,
and is commonly considered to prohibit the Federal Government from
regulating insurance. 55 The drafters of the Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, however, explicitly stated in section two that the Act will not
affect the authority and responsibility of the states to regulate insurance
56
as long as they do so consistently with the Nondiscrimination Act.
Congress' intent is manifested in section five of the Nondiscrimination
Act which places primary responsibiilty for enforcement of the Act
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.

54.
55.

56.

Id at 3495.
Id at 3493.
Id at 3498 (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709).
435 U.S. 702 (1978).
- U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3492 (1983).
While both Manhart and Norris involved public rather than private employers the feature
which allowed the courts to apply Title VII principles was the extent of employer participation in the operations of the pension plan. The necessary degree of participation is more
often found in the cases of public employers because they are often self-insured, as in Manharl. The principles of both cases apply equally to private employers.
H.R. 100, supra note 6.
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982). "Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence
on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States."
Hearings, supra note 4 at 294-95 (statement of Andre Maisonpierre, senior vice president,
Alliance of American Insurers).
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982). "The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business." Id § 1012. The primary purpose of this chapter was to preserve state regulation
of the activities of insurance companies.
H.R. 100, supra 6, § 2(b).
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with state and local authorities.57 Only after state remedies have been
exhausted does H.R. 100 allow a civil action to be brought in federal
district court for damages.5" The United States Attorney General will
unless a "pattern or pracnot bring suit on behalf of the government
59
tice" of discrimination is established.
When viewed as a civil rights bill rather than an insurance bill,
60
H.R. 100 does not interfere with the states' right to regulate insurance.
The congressional finding that
discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin in the
conduct of business by an insurer (1) burdens the commerce of the
Nation; (2) impairs the economic welfare of large numbers of consumers who rely on the protection of such policies and contracts; (3) constitutes an unfair trade practice which adversely affects commerce; and
(4) makes it difficult for employers to comply with 6Federal laws
prohibiting such discrimination against their employees, 1
demonstrates the congressional commitment to civil rights by viewing
the economic issues of insurance discrimination through the same antidiscrimination lens as Congress' civil rights policy. 62 H.R. 100 would
be useful in achieving full enforcement of Title VII in the area of employee fringe benefits when insurance comprises a substantial portion
57. Id § 5. Section five states, in part:
If an alleged discriminatory action occurs in a State, or political subdivision
thereof, which has a State or local law prohibiting such discriminatory action and
establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such
discriminatory action or to institute criminal proceedings with respect to such action
upon receiving written notice of such action within one hundred and eighty days after
the alleged discriminatory action occurs, the provisions of this section shall apply.
(b) It is the purpose of this Act to accord to State and local authorities the primary opportunity to enforce the State or local laws prohibiting such discriminatory
action before an aggrieved person may invoke the judicial remedy provided under
section 6 of this Act. Therefore, no suit shall be filed under section 6 before the expiration of sixty days after the State or local authority has received the notice specified
in subsection (a) of this section, unless any proceeding begun by the State or local
authority after such notice has been earlier terminated (except that such sixty-day
periods shall be one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective
date of such State or local law). The notice of the alleged discriminatory action to
commence such State or local proceedings shall be filed within the time prescribed by
such State or local law, provided such prescribed time is not less than one hundred
and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory action occurred.
58. H.R. 100, supra note 6, § 6. Section six permits civil actions to be brought in state or federal
district court when either:
(a) no State or local law prohibits such discriminatory acts, and therefore no procedure to redress such injury exists;
(b) if a State or local authority fails within 60 days of notice of discrimination to
take appropriate action specified under Section 5 of the bill.
59. Id § 7. Section seven permits the Attorney General to bring a cause of action when he
reasonably believes that any person or group of persons is engaged in a "pattern or practice
of resistance to [other person's) full enjoyment" of nondiscrimination, or when he reasonably
believes that denial of rights granted under this act amounts to "an issue of general public
importance." Section nine allows the plaintiff to recover for actual damages sustained including reimbursement for excess rates paid or inadequate benefits received. It also allows
for punitive damages of amount not to exceed $25,000 for an individual or $800,000 in a
class action.
60. The bill is not regulating insurance, it is merely prohibiting discrimination.
61. H.R. 100, supra note 6, § 2(a).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 20002-e (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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of employee compensation.6 3
When the states refuse or neglect to legislate civil rights issues, the
Federal Government is obliged to step in.' The discrimination practiced by insurance companies limits social and economic opportunities
for women to such an extent that a federal law is needed to correct the
inequities which result.65
The cost of insurance is especially important to women who are
heads of households, single, widowed or divorced.6 6 Traditional
stereotypes of women working out of boredom rather than necessity
hampers them in the work place. These stereotypes lead to discrimination which in part causes the average woman to still make only sixty
cents to every dollar earned by the average man,67 and to pay
thousands of dollars more than a man in insurance premiums over her
lifetime 68 for the same benefits.
The insurance industry continues to be more concerned with their
profit margin than with the protection of civil rights. During hearings
on H.R. 100, an insurance company executive stated:
Insurance rate making does not exist as a force to remedy inadequate
employment opportunities for women, or unequal salary levels. Nor is
insurance ratemaking capable of redistributing income to assure that
men and women have identical costs and income regardless of circumstances and exposure to risks. Yet, that is exactly what H.R. 100 seeks
to accomplish. 9

House bill 100 is not meant to provide a panacea for all of society's
ills. It will not raise female salary levels or increase their employment
opportunities; however it will treat individuals equally, without regard
to their sex, in determining insurance premiums.
USE OF SEX AS THE DETERMINATIVE FACTOR
IN RISK CLASSIFICATION

The insurance industry argues that insurance could never have been
70
developed if categories were not used to evaluate individual risk.
63. Hearings, supra note 4, at 444 (statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). While Title VII speaks specifically of hiring and discharge
decisions, it also prohibits discrimination in compensation, which includes fringe benefits. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
64. Such was the situation with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).

65. Hatch, supra note 28 at 10.
66. Sixty-six percent of all working women fall into this category. Hearings,supra note 4, at 205
(testimony of Dr. Mary Amos, National President, Women's Equity Action League).
67. Median Money Income of Year-Round, Full-Time Workers With Income, by Sex and Age,
1970-1980, VITAL STATISTICS supra note 3, at 438.
68.

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INSURANCE:

EACH POLICY HAS Two PRICES:

WOMEN'S AND MEN'S (1983). Over her lifetime, a woman will pay $1,640 more for automo-

bile insurance, $6,662 more for medical insurance, $4,854 more for disability insurance and
$5,856 more for life insurance pension coverage than a similarly situated man.
69. Hearings,supra note 4, at 409 (statement of George K. Bernstein).
70. Id

Individual risk is calculated on the basis of group risk.
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This is true, and as a basic proposition, is not undercut by H.R. 100.
The bill would not eliminate risk classification, but only classifications
based on protected categories such as race, religion, sex, or national
origin.
While it is true that as a group women outlive men,7 it is also true
that as a group whites outlive blacks.7 2 Yet, no insurance company
currently bases rates on race, or national origin. Insurers at one time
did charge blacks higher life insurance rates than whites, until it was
established that differences in longevity were caused by socio-economic
factors rather than inherent racial characteristics. 73 The same arguments that were used to justify racial discrimination in insurance in the
1950's are being used today to justify sexual discrimination.7"
Why do women as a group outlive men? It may be because of some
inherent genetic characteristic,7 or because the lifestyles traditionally
approved for women in culture have tended to be healthier and less
stressful than those sanctioned for men. Men are more likely than females to consume alcohol,76 and the quantity and frequency of alcohol
consumption for males far exceeds that of females.7 7 Males also smoke
more than females.7" The leading cause of death in this country among
both men and women is heart disease,79 to which smoking," ° alcohol
consumption, and stress are all closely linked. 8a It may be this type of
activity rather than "maleness" in itself which gives men as a group a
shorter life expectancy.
Still, the insurance industry remains adamant in its contention that
"every woman has the same statistical probability of outliving men of
83
the same age."8 2 Any life expectancy actuarial table will verify this.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

supra note 3, at 72.
In 1979 the average life expectancy for whites was 74.4 yrs compared with 69.8 yrs for blacks.
Id. at 71.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 24 (comments of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
Hearings, supra note 4, at 52 (letter from Rep. John Dinsell to Meg Greenfield).
See Brilmayer, Laycock and Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A.Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 222-49 (1983).
VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 123. In 1979, 72% of adult males consumed alcohol compared to 52% of adult females.
Id. Statistics obtained in 1977 indicate that approximately three times more men than women consume alcohol three or more times a week and approximately twice as many men
consume five or more "drinks" at one sitting.
Id. at 124. 36.5% of men and 29.1% of women smoke. In addition, the men who smoke use
more cigarettes per day than women.
Id at 77.
FACTS ON FILE 1003 (1983).
The major risk factors include high blood pressure and cholesterol. WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS 85 (1984). See generally Walis, Hold the Eggs and Butter, TIME,Mar. 26,
1983, at 56-63.
American Council Brief, supra note 27, at 9.
At every age, women have a greater life expectancy than men. For an example of an actuarial table, see the following reprinted below.
VITAL STATISTICS,

466
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The insurance industry, however, ignores the fact that after age sixtyfive, eighty-four percent of male and female deaths overlap.8 4 This fact
means that only eight percent of all males die "early," before age sixtyfive, unmatched by an equal percentage of female deaths, and that only
eight percent of all females die "late," unmatched by male deaths.85

Only eight percent of the female population experiences this "greater

longevity" which the industry has attributed to all females, 86 yet the
entire class must bear the financial burdens.
Few people actually live the "average" length of time. When statisticians speak of the "average person" or "average" length of time, they
are attributing the mean distribution to every individual in the class.87
"Individual" life expectancy values become merely an application of
the group average to the individual. 8
When insurance companies refuse to recognize an individual woman apart from the group, they are creating an irrebuttable presumption that women outlive men. A man's lifestyle, particularly health
care, may improve his life expectancy, yet his pension benefits will not
decrease. Similarly, a woman's lifestyle may shorten her life expectancy without affecting her pension benefits.
The Supreme Court has rejected irrebuttable presumptions based
upon sex, which it views as a protected classification. 89 In the 1976 case
of Craig v. Boren, the Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute which
SELECTED LIFE TABLE VALUES: 1939 TO 1979
[Prior to 1960, excludes Alaska and Hawaii. Beginning 1970, excludes deaths of nonresidents of the United
States. See Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970, series B 116-125]
WHITE
AGE AND SEX

BLACK AND OTHER

1939- 1949- 1959- 1969- 1975
1941 1951 1961 1971

1979

1939- 1949- 1959- 1969- 1975
1941 1951 1961 1971

1979 Black,
1979

AVERAGE EXPECTATION OF LIFE IN YEARS
At birth: Male .....
Female ....
Age 20: Male .....
Female ....
Age 40: Male ...
Female ...
Age 50: Male ..
Female....
Age 65: Male ..
Female....

62.8
67.3
47.8
51.4
30.0
33.3
22.0
24.7
12.1
13.6

66.3
72.0
49.5
54.6
31.2
35.6
22.8
26.8
12.8
15.0

67.6
74.2
50.3
56.3
31.7
37.1
23.3
28.1
13.0
15.9

67.9
75.5
50.2
57.2
31.9
38.1
23.3
29.1
13.0
16.9

69.4
77.21
51.4
58.6
33.0
39.4
24.3
30.3
13.7
18.1

70.6
78.2
52.3
59.5
33.9
40.2
25.1
31.9
14.2
18.7

52.3
55.5
39.7
42.1
25.2
27.3
19.2
21.0
12.2
14.0

58.9
62.7
43.7
46.8
27.3
29.8
20.3
22.7
12.8
14.5

61.5
66.5
45.8
50.1
28.7
32.2
21.3
24.3
12.8
15.1

61.0
69.1
44.4
51.9
28.3
33.9
21.2
26.0
12.9
16.0

63.6
72.3
46.3
54.7
29.8
36.2
22.4
27.9
13.7
17.5

65.5
74.2
47.8
56.2
30.9
37.6
23.2
29.0
14.4
18.4

64.0
72.7
46.4
54.8
29.6
36.2
22.1
27.8
13.3
17.2

VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 71.
Bergmann & Gray, Equality in Retirement Benefits, 8 Civ. RTS. DIG. 25-27 (1975).
Id
Supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 563-64 (statement of Douglas Laycock on behalf of the American
Association of University Professors).
88. Id at 564.
89. Sex is a protected classification only in situations covered by Title VII. As a matter of general constitutional law, sex is considered a protected classification and distinctions based on
sex will be given an intermediate level of scrutiny, as compared with distinctions based on
the suspect classification of race, which will undergo strict scrutiny, and age, which must
meet only a rational basis test. Distinctions based on sex will pass constitutional scrutiny
where shown to be substantially related to important governmental objectives. Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).

84.
85.
86.
87.
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prohibited the sale of 3.2 beer to males under twenty-one years of age
while allowing females to purchase the beverage at age eighteen. 9 ° The
Court found that this gender-based discrimination denied males equal
protection of the law. 91 Despite statistics indicating that young males
were involved in more alcohol-related accidents than young females,
the conclusion that sex presents an accurate ground for the regulation
of drinking age was held unwarranted. 92 The Manhart and Norris
holdings are based on the same rationale. 93 Statistical evidence that
women, as a group, outlive men cannot support the conclusion that any
individual woman will outlive any individual man.
AUTO INSURANCE
Sex should not be used to predict life expectancy or accident rates.
The fact that men as a group have more accidents than women as a
group is irrelevant to the case of an individual male with a clean driving record. Yet forty-six states
currently use sex as a basis for deter94
mining auto insurance rates.
Women have lower accident rates than men but the statistics do not
establish that women are necessarily better drivers. Statistics do reflect
that women as a group drive less frequently and shorter distances than
men, as a group, drive. 95 In fact, women drive an average of ten thousand miles less per year than men.96 A 1973 Department of Transportation (DOT) report indicates that in every category of annual mileage,
women have a lower accident-per-mile ratio than men. 97 Considering
the overall average of the total number of miles driven and accident
rates per mile, however, women have a twenty-six percent higher accident-per-mile ratio than men.98 Thus, it appears that women rather
than men are more likely to have automobile accidents.
The 1973 DOT report is misleading for a number of reasons. When
the study was conducted in 1973, male drivers outnumbered female
90. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
91. Id
92. Id at 199-204 (1976).
93. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
94. Massachusetts, Hawaii, North Carolina and Michigan have outlawed the use of sex in setting
insurance premiums. The first three states have also abolished rate setting on the basis of
marital status or age and have opted instead to set rates according to the number of an
individual's years of driving experience. Pennsylvania has also dropped age as a rate-setting
factor. Hearings, supra note 4, at 398 (statement of J.R. Hunter, president, National Insurance Consumer Organization).
95. See Chart, infra note 98.
96. Id
97. Id
98. Hearings,supra note 4, at 1001 (materials submitted for the record by the Alliance of American Insurers).
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drivers. 9 9 Males also tend to be licensed at a younger age than females,
resulting in a greater number of young male drivers being represented
in the study.' 00 Consequently, the male accident rate is skewed by the
presence of these young drivers in the statistical sampling who have
four times the number of reported accidents of the average driver.'0 '
The major flaw in the DOT study results from the industry practice of
attributing
all accidents to the highest risk driver insured under the policy.10 2 Cars operated by youthful operators, the highest risk classification, have more drivers per car than cars operated by non-youthful
operators. 10 3 A youthful operator is often covered under a parent's insurance policy."4 This causes all accidents involving that car to be statistically attributed to the younger driver regardless of who was
operating the vehicle at the time. 10 5
Another study, conducted by the California Insurance Department,
demonstrated that on a mileage-adjusted basis, in most age groups, feACCIDENT RECORDS BY SEX AND ANNUAL MILEAGE
MALES
(I)

FEMALES

(2)

(3)

Annual

Average

3 Yr.
Accident

Average
Accident
Rate Per

(5)

(7)

Average

3 Yr.
Accident

Accident
Rate Per

Mileage

(4)

Mileage

Mileage

Record

Mile*

Record

Mile*

Up to 2,499

1,480

.163

.110

1,495

.079

.053

2,500 - 4,999

3,445

.268

.078

3,323

.103

.031

7,500 - 9,999

8,274

.229

.028

8,185

.179

.022

10,000 - 14,999

11,240

.271

.024

11,026

.242

.022

15,000 - 19,999

15,860

.319

.020

15,652

.249

.016

20,000 - 24,949

20,638

.345

.017

20,839

.299

.014

25,000 - 29,999

25,437

.353

.014

25,537

.277

.011

30,000 - 39,999

31,982

350

.011

32,041

.271

.008

40,000 - 49,999

41,592

.430

.010

42,506

.273

.006

50,000 +

70,616

.563

.008

58,926

.318

.005

Total (Avg.)

17,671

.305

.017

7,211

.163

.023

*[Column (2) + Column (1)] x 1,000; [Column (5)

+ Column (4)]

X 1,000 (for ease of

expression)
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration (with California Department of Public Works), The Effects of Exposure to Risk on Driving Record,
June, 1973.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

The average annual mileage for male drivers is 17,671 miles. The average accident rate per
mile is .017 compared with .023 for females, who drive an average of 7,211 miles annually.
Id
Hearings,supra note 4, at 176-77 (statement of Wynona M. Lipman, chair, New Jersey Commission on Sex Discrimination in the Statutes).
Id
Id
Id at 185.
Hearings,supra note 4, at 398 (statement of J. Robert Hunter, president, National Insurance
Consumer Organization).
Id at 408.
Id at 185 (testimony of Wynona M. Lipman).
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males had more accidents than males.10 6 In all age groups, females had
fifty-seven percent more accidents per mile and were thirty percent
0 7
more expensive to insure as a group on a per-mile basis than males.
The difference between male and female accident rates on a per mile
basis can be attributed to a decreasing rate of accidents per additional
mile as total miles driven increase. 0 8 The accident rate differential
between men and women when adjusted for age and mileage is reduced to five percent.'0 9
The use of gender classification produces ambiguous results. The
National Highway Traffic Safety Association found that accident rates
are highly correlated with both sex and miles driven."' When sex is
used as a basis for setting premiums it is merely a substitute for mileage
driven. By using sex as an indicator, the insurance companies are confusing causation with correlation. The majority of people involved in
auto accidents are male."' Nevertheless, this does not prove that sex
causes the accidents, but only that the two factors are related. Another
independent factor, such as mileage, is more likely to cause accidents.
The statistics demonstrate that while sex may be correlated to accident
rates, these rates are determined by other, independent factors making
it clear that sex is not an accurate predictor of insurance risk. Use of
sex as a substitute for factors such as mileage driven erroneously suggests that sex in and of itself determines driving ability and accident
probability.
COST IMPACT OF HOUSE BILL 100

If H.R. 100 is enacted, auto insurance rates for females will in all
likelihood increase. ' 2 Hardest hit among female drivers will be the
sixteen to twenty-four year old principal operator. "' Similarly situated
106. Id at 144 (testimony of Wynona M. Lipman). But see Hearings at 312-14 (statement of the
Alliance of American Insurers, contradicting Ms. Lipman on the basis of the same data).
107. Id at 144 (testimony of Wynona M. Lipman).
108. Id at 145. Accident rates decrease as driving experience increases.
109. Id at 144-45. Male adjusted rate is calculated as follows: Men at age 21 drive on average of
17,306 miles/year (1/17,306 / (55/100)) = .00003278088 accidents/mile; 55 = # accidents
per 100 miles per 100 drivers. Females at age 21 drive an average of 7,237 miles/year, 29 =
# accidents per 100 miles per 100 drivers) (1/7,273 / (29/100)) = .0000398735 accidents/
mile. Id at 157.
110. Id at 184.
111. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT ON TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AND INJURIES FOR 1979-1980, 61

(1981).
112. Hearing,supra note 4, at 216-17 (statememt of Dr. Mary Gray, national president, Women's
Equity Action League).
113. Id. at 375 (statement of the National Association of Independent Insurers, presented by Galen R. Barnes). Based on data derived from Ohio, Mr. Barnes predicted that an average 16
year old principal operator would experience an increase of 59% from $348.20 to $555.30. In
contrast, a typical 24 year old occasional operator could anticipate a 14% increase from
$210.10 to $239.50. Testimony of T. Lawrence Jones on behalf of the American Insurance
Association supports Mr. Barnes' predictions and provides additional data pertaining to selected other states. Id at 326-57.
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males will experience rate decreases.' 14 Males and females in the overtwenty-four age group who only drive occasionally will experience the
least change in their insurance premiums." 5 Use of independent factors will cause costs to shift from good drivers to bad drivers on an
individual basis, and only incidentally from men to women." 6 Women
will not lose any decisive advantage through the enactment of H.R.
100. Although males in every age group have an accident rate 1.43
times that of women, only young men are presently surcharged for
their poor driving records."' Any "gain" to young women through
reduced insurance premium's is lost in subsidizing men's lower rates
for the remainder of their driving lives" 18 when premiums equalize.
The battle which has been fought over equalizing pension benefits
has resulted in a barrage of statistics from both sides. If insurers are
required to "top up" pension plans by increasing benefits of the lowest
paid sex to the current level of the higher paid sex, the insurance industry estimates that the cost will exceed three billion dollars a year.' 9
The Department of Labor places the cost at 1.7 billion dollars.' 2 The
arguments of both sides became moot when a compromise was reached
in the House which would make the Nondiscrimination in Insurance
Act applicable only to future insurance contracts and pension plans.12
This compromise dissipates any possible objections
under the Contract
22
Clause of the United States Constitution.
Finally, H.R. 100 presents the problem of ambiguity surrounding
state enforcement. Section five of the Nondiscrimination Act gives the
states the primary opportunity for enforcement but without guidance as
to which state agency will have jurisdiction. 23 Confusion could arise
over whether the claim should be handled by a state insurance commis114. Hearings, supra note 4, at 375 (statement of the National Association of Independent Insurers, presented by Galen R. Barnes).
115. 1d

116. Hearing, supra note 4, at 216 (statement of Dr. Mary Gray).
117. Hearings, supra note 4, at 262 (statement of Judy Goldsmith, president, National Organization for Women).
118. 1d

119. Hearings, supra note 4, at 507 (statement of the American Academy of Actuaries).
120. M. Connerton, supra note 15, at 3. The difference can be partly attributed to the fact that the
insurers included all railroad retirement participants and other workers whose plans are already gender neutral. See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 53 (Letter from Representative
John Dingell to Meg Greenfield).
121. Press conference on H.R. 100, with Representative James J. Florio, D-N.J. (Oct. 27, 1983)
(available at offices of Journalof Legislation).
122. "No State ...

shall pass any . . . . law impairing the obligation of contract." U.S. Const.

art. 1, § 9. The argument has been made that if H.R. 100 applied to existing contracts it
would alter the obligations and expectations of insurers, violating the obligation of contracts.
Hearings,supra note 4, at 34 (memo from Congressional Research Library Service to Representative John Dingell). Due to the compromises, the Act will only apply to future contracts
of insurance. The cited argument emphasizes that H.R. 100, if enacted retroactively, could
violate the "obligation of contracts component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. It would not infringe on the Contracts Clause, because that clause relates only to
states, and not to the Federal Government.
123. H.R. 100, § 5, supra note 6. See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of the Civil
Rights Commission).
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sion or a state civil rights agency. 2 4 The United States Civil Rights
Commission urged that judicial preference be given to a state insurance
department with an alternative forum in the civil rights agency should
the former fail.'2 5 This decision, if left to the individual states, creates
the risk of a potential cause of action falling through the cracks of a
state bureaucracy. Section five should be specifically amended to provide that the state insurance commissioner has the first priority in
bringing a suit to enforce the Nondiscrimination Act.
CONCLUSION
House bill 100 should not be viewed as a bill to regulate the insurance industry but rather as a civil rights bill. While much debate has
focused on the use of accurate actuarial statistics, this debate obscures
the central issue of sex-based discrimination, which is the violation of
individual rights through certain classifications.
This note has demonstrated that sex is neither a fair nor accurate
indicator of risk in pension plan or auto insurance calculations. Sex
does not determine life expectancy or accident rates. Independent factors, such as lifestyle, medical history, mileage and driving experience,
are the true indicators of risk and the appropriate factors for group
classification.
In 1920, women in this country outlived men by an average of only
one year. 1 26 Today women as a group outlive men by nearly seven
years.127 Female longevity is a modern phenomenon which cannot be
dismissed as genetic, 28 but is rather a product of medical advances and
increased attention to personal health. 129 The dramatic increase in life
expectancy between the sexes indicates that sex is not an accurate predictor 3 of life expectancy but is instead only one factor in a complicated equation. Today's life expectancy predictions based on sex will
likely be outdated by the middle of the next century. Present knowledge of life expectancy trends is necessarily based on those who have
already died, and thus, these figures do not reflect modern changes in
lifestyle.
Life expectancy is a statistical probability which can be increased
on paper by changing one's marital status, religion, or residence. Women as a group do outlive men, but no one can predict which individual woman will outlive which individual man. It is time that the
insurance industry be prevented from continuing to make individuals
124. Hearings, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of the Civil Rights Commission).

125. Id
126. Hearings, supra note 4, at 579 (statement of Douglas Laycock on behalf of the American
Association of University Professors). See also VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 72.
127. See VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 71.
128. Hearings,supra note 4, at 579 (statement of Douglas Laycock on behalf of the American
Association of University Professors).
129. Id
130. Id at 580
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pay for the "sins" of the group, which is precisely the type of practice
modem American civil rights law has sought to eliminate. H.R. 100
will extend this constitutional policy to the insurance industry, where
women have long felt and paid for its inequities.
Karen A. MeCluskey*
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